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eBay v. MercExchange and KSR Int'l Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc.: The Supreme Court Wages
War Against Patent Trolls
Todd Klein*
I. Introduction
Imagine that you are the owner of a small to mid-sized company
called Windows R' Us that manufactures windows in the state of
Pennsylvania.' Your company has manufactured windows by way of a
very specific process for five years and has produced beautiful windows.
Without your knowledge, See Thru, a company that manufactures
windows out of California and is on the verge of bankruptcy, sold its
patent portfolio to Sneak-a-Peak. Although See Thru has never
mentioned that your manufacturing process was infringing a process
patent that they owned, Sneak-a-Peak now makes you aware of this fact.
However, Sneak-a-Peak is not even in the business of manufacturing
windows. Instead, Sneak-a-Peak is a company that owns several
hundred patents and spends its time locating companies that are creating
products that infringe any the patents that it owns. Regardless of how
See Thru feels and whether or not you are competing with See Thru for
potential customers, Sneak-a-Peak now owns this patent and has every
right to either enter into a licensing agreement with you or sue you for
infringement. You are now in quite a bind. If you do not enter into a
licensing agreement, you will potentially be liable for monetary damages
and are running the risk of having a permanent injunction issued against
you. This permanent injunction could put you out of business forever.
You have just been victimized by a patent troll.
"Patent trolls," also known as "non-practicing entities" or "patent
holding companies," are essentially non-manufacturing patent owners
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennylvania State
University, expected May 2008.
1. This is simply a hypothetical to show the possible devastation that patent trolls
can cause. The company could be manufacturing any product through any method.
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who are either individuals or companies that purchase patents and assert
them with no intention of creating or manufacturing a product using the
patented technology. 2 Although the Supreme Court has never spoken
directly on the issue of patent trolls, 3 Congress has previously taken steps
to minimize the damage that patent trolls can cause to manufacturing
companies.4 Additionally, many scholars in the intellectual property
industry are critics of the methods that patent trolls utilize in making
enormous profits on their patented technologies without actually
manufacturing any products.5
The Assistant General Counsel for Intel, Peter Detkin, coined the
term "patent troll" in 2001 when he was defending Intel in infringement
suits that were necessitated by these patent trolls. 6 According to Detkin,
a patent troll is "somebody who tries to make a lot of money off a patent
that they are not practicing and have no intention of practicing and in
most cases never practiced.",7  Patent trolls can be individuals or
organizations whose main or sole purpose is to threaten large, deep-
pocketed companies with litigation. This enables them to generate large
amounts of revenue through licensing because the deep-pocketed
companies want to avoid litigation and the possibility of a subsequent
permanent injunction.8
2. David G. Barker, Troll or No Troll? Policing Patent Usage with an Open Post-
Grant Review, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9, 7 (2005).
3. Robert P. Merges, Supreme Court Development: Introductory Note to Brief of
Amicus Curiae in eBay v. MercExchange, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 997 (2006).
However, in his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy does refer directly to the threat
posed by patent trolls, although he never uses the phrase "patent trolls" and instead
describes them as firms who use patents "not as a basis for producing and selling goods
but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees." eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct.
1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
4. Brief for Yahoo! Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130). In the past, patent trolls
created what were known as "submarine patents" whereby they submitted an application
for a patent, but failed to reveal that fact until after a manufacturing company had already
spent a considerable sum of money developing a product that arguably infringed the
patent. At that time, the patent troll would quickly try to force their patent application
into issue. Id. Congress' amendment to the Patent Act in 1999 now requires patent
applications to be published eighteen months after filing. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A)
(2006). However, there are still many methods of avoiding this publication. One such
method is achieved by the applicant guaranteeing that he/she will not file the application
in any other country with an eighteen-month publication requirement. 35 U.S.C.
§ 122(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006).
5. Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts: Let's Build a PIT to Catch the
Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 367, 377 (2005).
6. M. Qaiser & P. Mohan Chandran, Patent Terrorism-Terror of the Intangibles,
ENTERPRISE IP, June 27, 2006, http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=
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This Comment will analyze two cases on which the Supreme Court
has recently ruled.9 Specifically, Part I of this Comment will detail how
the holdings of those cases have the potential of combating patent trolls
and preventing them from causing such a significant amount of harm to
accused patent infringers. Part II of this Comment gives examples of
specific companies that are patent trolls and what they have
accomplished in their business practices. This should generate a further
understanding of the devastation that they cause to the individuals and
companies that they accuse of infringement. Part III explores whether
the patent trolling industry is bad for inventors and the world at large.
Part IV focuses on the eBay case, the precedent cases, and how
injunctions are granted under the Copyright Act. Part IV also explains
how the Court's decision in the eBay case can be seen as a method of
combating patent trolls. Part V switches the concentration of this
Comment to the KSR case. Part V will focus on the standard of
obviousness that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had been
using prior to the Supreme Court's reversal. Part V also delves into the
oral arguments heard by the Supreme Court in the KSR case. Part VI
discusses the implications that overruling the test announced by Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit will have on patent trolls.
II. Examples of Companies that are Patent Trolls
To get a better sense of what a patent troll does and why they face
such a great deal of criticism, it is helpful to provide a few examples of
litigation that has been initiated by patent trolls.
A. NTP, Inc.
Research in Motion (RIM) is the company that makes the
Blackberry. 10 The Blackberry utilizes a technology that is covered by a
patent owned by NTP, Inc. (NTP).1" NTP is known to be a patent
holding company that does not make any products but instead acquires
patent portfolios in order to sue deep-pocketed companies for
infringement.12 As a result of a patent infringement suit initiated by NTP
against RIM, after five years of litigation, RIM decided to settle the suit
for $612.5 million in order to avoid having a permanent injunction issued
against them and having the Blackberry service shut down its 4.3 million
9. The two cases are eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) and KSR Int'l
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
10. David V. Radack, Patent Trolls: Pay up or Fight? 8 LAW. J. 3,3 (2006).
11. Id.
12. Qaiser & Chandran, supra note 6, at 1.
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subscribers. 13
B. Acacia Technologies
Another example of a patent troll is a company called Acacia
Technologies (AT). 14  AT has acquired twenty patent portfolios
comprising approximately 127 patents. 15 As AT's staff is comprised
mostly of attorneys and accountants with only a few engineers whose
sole job is to analyze existing patents, AT clearly fits the definition of a
patent troll. 16 AT has made millions of dollars from licensing fees by
targeting companies that will suffer more harm through the threat of a
permanent injunction than by payment to AT. 17 There are many other
companies that are considered patent trolls, and their effect on the
intellectual property industry has been more severe in recent years than
before. This is based solely upon the fact that the number of patent
litigation suits had doubled between 1995 and 2004.18
C. Forgent Networks
One final example of a patent troll is Forgent Networks. 19 Forgent
Networks acquired a patent related to data compression technology
giving them the exclusive right to use the JPEG method of compressing
digital video images.2°  In 2004, Forgent sued forty companies
worldwide for infringement of its patented technology. 2' Thus far,
Forgent has received over $100 million in licensing fees as a result of
these lawsuits. That number is expected to increase to over $1 billion
once they reach an agreement with Dell and the companies that they sued
in 2005 as a result of a different patent.
22
13. Radack, supra note 10, at 3.
14. Ferrill, supra note 5, at 374.
15. Qaiser & Chandran, supra note 6, at 2.
16. Ferrill, supra note 5, at 374.
17. Id.
18. Joe Fowler, "Patent Trolls" Stalk This Land, MANUFACTURING Bus. TECH.,
http://www.mbtmag.comlcurrent-issues/2005/declbusperfl.asp (last visited June 1,
2007).
19. Qaiser & Chandran, supra note 6, at 2.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. In the middle of 2005, Forgent Networks sued fifteen companies for
infringing one of its patents that dealt with a computer regulated video system enabling
playback during recording. Id. A few more examples of patent trolls are Fougines &
Day, Karlin Technology, PhoneTel, and Eolas Technologies. See Qaiser & Chandran,
supra note 6, at 2.
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III. Patent Trolls: Good for Business or Bad for Innovation?
A. Why Scholars are Against the Patent Trolling Industry
Scholars in the industry have many reasons for opposing the patent
trolling industry. At the outset, it may seem reasonable for an individual
or company who owns the rights to a patent to charge licensing fees to
other companies or individuals who wish to use the patented technology
in a product that they are manufacturing. However, the problem is that
under the general rule announced by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit),2 3 companies that owned the
rights to a patent were able to charge exorbitant licensing fees due to the
24threat of a permanent injunction issuing against the potential licensee.
Basically, a company that is manufacturing a product that incorporates
another company's patented technology will be harmed more by facing
the possibility of a permanent injunction being issued against it than by
simply paying the licensing fee that the patent owner requests. 25 This is
true regardless of how high and unfairly priced that licensing fee may
be.
26
Additionally, some believe that patent trolls deter innovation.27 The
United States Constitution states, "Congress shall have the power to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries. 28 The founders wanted to give the people of
the United States an incentive to create inventions in order to promote
the arts and sciences in this country.2 9 The founders did this by giving
inventors the right to an exclusive period of ownership over their
23. The general rule is discussed in Part IV of this Comment. In MercExchange, the
Federal Circuit held that courts would issue permanent injunctions against patent
infringers absent exceptional circumstances. Essentially, this created a rule that made the
issuance of permanent injunctions automatic subsequent to a finding of infringement.
See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
However, that verdict was overturned when it was appealed to the Supreme Court. See
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
24. Brief for Yahoo! Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130).
25. Id.
26. Id. Although a licensing fee may take a substantial portion of a company's
profits, a court ordered permanent injunction can put that company out of business
completely by preventing it from making the product that the business relies on
altogether. Anthony J. Fitzpatrick, Patent Infringement Injunctions Will Likely Hold
Some Surprises Now, http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/article2252.html (last visited
June 1, 2007).
27. Barker, supra note 2, at 8.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
29. Ferrill, supra note 5, at 369.
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invention, so they may profit from the expense and time that they put
into creating their invention.30 Typically, patent trolls are not inventors
themselves, but rather they are companies that purchase patents from
inventors with the sole purpose of suing for infringement any company
that is using the patented technology.31 In doing so, these patent trolls,
who are not inventors, are deterring actual inventors from continuing to
invent.3 2  Although the inventors may create a new and useful
technology, if that new technology uses any component of an already
patented technology, they will be facing large licensing fees 33 and
possibly a permanent injunction.34
One final argument supporting the assertion that the patent trolling
industry is an unfair business practice is that oftentimes patent trolls will
purchase ten to fifteen-year-old patents that had not been enforced for
that entire period, irrespective of whether or not individuals and
companies had been infringing the patent.3 5 The companies later accused
of infringement have been doing business without notice of the patent for
that entire period and therefore feel very secure in their business
36practices. Additionally, quite befitting of the word "troll," it is not
uncommon for a patent troll to know about an invention that infringes
one of its patents as it is first coming to the market.3 7 These trolls then
wait for investors to throw huge amounts of money into the supposed
new invention.a At that point, they strike out at the maker of the
invention demanding exorbitant licensing fees with the risk that if the
30. Brief for Yahoo! Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130).
3 1. Barker, supra note 2, at 7.
32. Brief for Yahoo! Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130).
33. There is also an idea called "cross-licensing arrangements" that plays a role. Id.
Legitimate companies engage in what is known as "defensive patenting" by receiving the
rights to patents that they will not be using at the current time so that they can have the
rights to that technology in case they need it in the future. Id. The result is that company
A will have the patent to a technology that company B is using, but company A will also
be using patented technologies that are owned by company B or other rival companies.
Id. In this situation, "each side has a strong incentive to decline to enforce their patents
in return for mutual forbearance." Id. However, these cross-licensing arrangements do
not deter patent trolls from attempting to acquire large licensing fees because they are
non-practicing entities and remain unaffected by these practices. Id.
34. Brief for Yahoo! Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130).
35. See Geoff Daily, Acacia Makes Its Case, STREAMING MEDIA, Mar. 9, 2005,
http://www.streamingmedia.com/article.asp?id=9041 &page= I &c=31 (last visited June 1,
2007).
36. Id.
37. Michael Bloc, Beware the Patent Trolls, TAMING THE BEAST,
http://www.tamingthebeast.net/articles6/patent-troll.htm (last visited June 1, 2007).
38. Id.
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inventor does not agree to the licensing agreement, a very expensive
legal battle will begin.39 In this way, patent trolls are simply extorting
huge royalties out of companies and inventors through their questionable
business practices.4 °
B. Why Scholars Believe that Patent Trolls Are Not Bad For
Innovation
Aside from all of the negative connotations that come along with
the phrase "patent troll," many scholars believe that these entities cause
no harm.4' In keeping with that, these scholars see no reason for
Congress or the courts to take any affirmative action to prevent patent
trolls from continuing to sue companies for infringement and extract
large licensing fees from them.42 There are three major arguments as to
the benefits patent trolls bring to the intellectual property industry.4 3
First, by purchasing patents from inventors, patent trolls thereby give
inventors more capital to continue to invent new and useful
technologies.4 4 Second, patent trolls somewhat level the playing field for
small inventors by going after the larger companies 5 Third, patent trolls
are simply utilizing patents in the way that they were meant to be used,
as property.4 6
If patent trolls are able to purchase patents from inventors and then
enforce the patent rights through litigation, the inventors could do the
same thing for themselves. In most cases, there is a good chance that the
inventor will be able to make a substantially larger amount of money
through litigation and patent enforcement than by selling the rights to his
or her patented invention; otherwise the patent trolling industry would
not be able to survive. It is hard to believe that patent trolls are enabling
inventors to have more capital in order to continue to invent; in fact, it
appears that the opposite is true.
However, patent trolls often purchase patents from individual
inventors who simply do not have the resources to license or enforce
their own patents.4 7 For these types of inventors, patent trolls can use
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Phosita, Posting of Melody Wirz to phosita, Patent Trolling-Good or Bad?,
http://www.okpatents.com/phosita/archives/2005/04/patent-trolling.html (Apr. 1, 2005,
9:33 EST).
42. Id.




47. Daily, supra note 35, at I.
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their large bank accounts48 to prosecute patent litigation suits or to
acquire licensing fees and pay the inventor a fair price for his or her
invention.49 In so doing, these patent trolls give the inventors more
capital to invest in new inventions while making a fairly substantial
profit for themselves.
The third argument has the most merit in giving patent trolls a
legitimate reason to continue their current practice. The third theory is
that patent trolls are beneficial because they are simply using patent
rights as property as was intended by the framers of the Constitution.
The right associated with patent ownership is the right to "exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale or selling the invention throughout
the United States .... ,0 Simply put, patent trolls are doing exactly what
the Constitution and the Patent Act have given them a right to do: sue
individuals and companies for infringement when those individuals or
companies utilize the patent troll's patented technology. 5' This stands as
the major reason why scholars who are "pro patent troll" do not believe
patent trolls are committing any wrongs by suing for infringement when
their patented technology has legitimately been infringed.
5 2
Nevertheless, the harms caused by the patent trolling industry outweigh
the benefits to society. Whether or not the patent trolling industry is a
legitimate one, there is no reason that Congress and the Supreme Court
cannot combine their efforts to slow down or put an end to this industry
in order to safeguard the companies who are suffering as a result of the
patent trolls' infringement law suits.
IV. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange: Permanent Injunctions Are Not
Automatic Subsequent to a Finding of Infringement in Patent
Litigation Cases
There are two cases that the Supreme Court has recently ruled on
which implicitly take a stand against patent trolls.53 In eBay v.
48. For example, Acacia Technologies has $30 million in the bank and is fully
capable of enforcing the patents that they have purchased. Nancy Gohring, Hotspot
Operators Face New Patent Fee Demand, WI-FI NETWORKING NEWS, October 5, 2004,
http://wifinetnews.com/archives/004184.html (last visited June 1, 2007).
49. Morc often than not, the licensing fee being charged is unfair and typically
considered exorbitant. See Bloc, supra note 37; Posting of Joe to The Fire of Genius,
http://www.thefireofgenius.com/2006/05/15/the-ebay-earthquake-part-2/ (May 15, 2006,
10:50 EST).
50. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
51. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994).
52. Phosita, Posting of Melody Wirz to phosita, Patent Trolling-Good or Bad?,
http://www.okpatents.com/phosita/archives/2005/04/patent-trolling.html (Apr. 1, 2005,
9:33 EST).
53. Ben Klemens, The Supreme Court's Patent Trilogy: An Analysis, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION, May 30, 2006, http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/
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MercExchange,54 the Supreme Court vacated a decision by the Federal
Circuit. 5 In the case before the Federal Circuit, MercExchange, a patent
troll holding a "business method patent for an electronic market designed
to facilitate the sale of goods between private individuals" sued eBay for
infringement based on eBay's "Buy It Now" feature.56  The Federal
Circuit granted a permanent injunction to MercExchange thereby
prohibiting eBay from using the "Buy It Now" feature in the future.57
However, the Supreme Court of the United States vacated that decision
finding that the traditional four-factor test applied by courts of equity
when determining whether or not to grant a permanent injunction 58 also
applies to cases arising under the Patent Act.
59
The Supreme Court's holding in eBay is strictly what Congress
intended when it created the Patent Act.6 ° Section 283 of the Patent Act
states that courts "may grant injunctions in accordance with the
principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by
patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.",6' Because the
Patent Act explicitly says that injunctions may be granted according to
the principles of equity, the four-factor test established by the Court, a
test that is a well-established principle of equity, is the proper test to be
used.62 The Supreme Court also noted that it is within the discretion of
the district courts to determine whether a permanent injunction is proper
according to the four-factor test.
6 3
20060530klemens.htm (last visited June 1, 2007).
54. eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
55. MercExchange v. eBay, 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that the
general rule is that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringers
absent exceptional circumstances).
56. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839.
57. MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1339.
58. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839. In order to be awarded a permanent injunction, acourt
must apply the following four factor test:
[A] plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;
(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
Id.
59. Volume 35 of the United States Code is collectively known as the Patent Act.
The specific provision regarding injunctions comes from 35 U.S.C. § 283.
60. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006).
61. Id.
62. eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
63. Id. (citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982)).
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A. The Standard for Obtaining a Permanent Injunction in a Patent
Case
For almost a century prior to eBay, courts have turned to the holding
in Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.6 4 when
determining whether or not to grant a plaintiff injunctive relief. In that
case, the Court held that a patent owner could choose to use or not to use
his patent as he sees fit.65 He has the exclusive right to that patent, and
therefore maintains the right to exclude others from using the patented
invention whether or not the patent owner himself is using it.66 The
Court also made a distinction between reasonable and unreasonable non-
use of a patent. 67 Although they granted the injunction in this particular
case,68 the court made no decision on the issue of whether a case might
arise where "regarding the situation of the parties in view of the public
interest, a court of equity might be justified in withholding relief by
injunction.,, 69 The cases since Continental Paper Bag have heeded the
Supreme Court's decision not to decide whether a court could withhold
injunctive relief and, in many cases, courts have withheld injunctive
relief for various reasons.70
B. Contrary to the Federal Circuit's Decision in eBay, Courts Have a
History of Only Granting Permanent Injunctions when Absolutely
Necessary
Although the Federal Circuit announced its general rule, the trend
prior to that decision seems to have been that lower courts would issue
permanent injunctions only when completely necessary.7' In Foster v.
64. Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
65. Id. at 425.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 427-29.
68. Id. at 430.
69. Id.
70. See Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1321 (2d Cir. 1974)
(holding that a permanent injunction will not be issued because American Machine would
suffer an irreparable hardship and Foster will gain no appreciable benefit); Nerney v.
New York, 83 F.2d 409, 411 (2d. Cir. 1936) (holding that a permanent injunction will not
be issued because an injunction would cause greater injury to Nemey than benefit to New
York). Most often, the courts that have withheld the granting of a permanent injunction
have done so because an injunction would subject the infringer to an undue hardship.
Foster, 492 F.2d at 1321. This includes an injunction that would cause greater injury to
the infringer than benefit to the patent owner. Id.
71. Typically, this meant that permanent injunctions would be awarded when the
court determined that the patent was valid and there was a continuing infringement or a
strong likelihood that the infringer would continue to do so without a permanent
injunction. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544-46 (1987);
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982); W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v.
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American Machine & Foundry Company,7 2 the Second Circuit found that
American Machine had infringed upon the patent holder's welding
system patent.73 On appeal, the patent holder argued, inter alia, that the
district court erred by not awarding him a permanent injunction to
prevent American Machine from using his patented invention in the
future.74 However, the Second Circuit upheld the finding that an
injunction would be inappropriate because, as an injunction is "an
equitable remedy to be determined by the circumstances," American
Machine, as a manufacturer of the product, would be subjected to an
"irreparable hardship ... without any concomitant benefit to the
patentee" who does not manufacture the product.7 5 Instead of issuing an
injunction in this case,76 the court created a compulsory license so that
the patent holder could collect royalties on all of American Machine's
future sales of the patented system.
77
Although Foster is not a patent troll as that term is now defined in
the industry, the court found that because he was not manufacturing the
product that the accused infringer was making, but instead merely owned
the rights to a patent that was incorporated into the accused infringer's
product, an injunction was inappropriate and monetary damages would
suffice.78 The court's decision in Foster is very much on point with what
the Supreme Court held in eBay.79 The court in Foster essentially used
prong three of the four-factor test 8° in determining that it was not
appropriate to issue a permanent injunction. 81 The court decided that
because the accused infringer manufactured the product and the patent
holder did not, issuing an injunction would result in irreparable harm to
the accused infringer and would not provide any benefit to the patent
holder.
82
Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733
F.2d 858, 865-66 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
72. 492 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1974).
73. Foster, 492 F.2d at 1319.
74. Id. at 1324.
75. Id. The Second Circuit determined long ago that "[w]here it appears that a much
greater injury will be done to the infringer than benefit to the patentee, the court may,
within its equity power, grant an accounting only and deny injunctive relief." Nemey v.
New York, 83 F.2d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 1936).
76. Had an injunction been issued, American Machine would have been put out of
business without providing any benefit to the patent holder.
77. Foster, 492 F.2d at 1324.
78. Id.
79. eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006).
80. See supra note 58.
81. Foster, 492 F.2d at 1324.
82. Id.
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C. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence in eBay
Although the majority opinion in eBay did not distinguish between
non-practicing entities and legitimate companies that do manufacture
products, Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, explicitly discussed the
emerging industry developed by patent trolls.83 Justice Kennedy noted
that with the emergence of the industry of patent owners who use patents
solely for obtaining licensing fees, "an injunction, and the potentially
serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a
bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy
licenses to practice the patent. ' '84 Justice Kennedy went on to say:
When the patented invention is but a small component of the product
the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is
employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages
may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an
injunction may not serve the public interest.
85
It seems that Justice Kennedy was willing to come right out and say
what the majority of the Court was unwilling to do.86 He sent a warning
to patent trolls that the Supreme Court would be willing to make changes
in order to fight their existence and make it easier for manufacturing
companies to survive litigation when sued by patent trolls.87 Justice
Kennedy recognized that the patent system was changing and that under
the Patent Act, the equitable discretion granted to the courts should
enable the courts to be able to adapt to those changes and maintain a
positive environment for inventors to continue to develop new
technologies. 88
D. The Supreme Court's Holding in eBay is Consistent with the Way
Courts Determine Injunctive Relief Under the Copyright Act
Very similar to the rights granted to patent owners under the Patent
Act, Congress created title 17 of the United States Code and called it the
Copyright Act.8 9 Under the Copyright Act, a court may grant "temporary
and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent





88. Id. As noted above, the Patent Act states that courts may grant injunctions "on
such terms as the court deems reasonable." 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006). This statute grants
the district courts significant latitude in determining whether or not they believe an
injunction is fair and/or necessary. See id.
89. 17U.S.C. § 101 etal.
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or restrain infringement of a copyright." 90  The Supreme Court has
consistently rejected the theory that permanent injunctions should issue
automatically subsequent to a finding of infringement in a copyright
case. 9' The Supreme Court has explicitly stated, "[T]he goals of the
copyright law ... are not always best served by automatically granting
injunctive relief when parodists are found to have gone beyond the
bounds of fair use. 9 2 Where there is a strong public interest in allowing
the second publication, and the copyright owner's interests can be fairly
met by an award of monetary damages, the Court will refuse to grant
injunctive relief.93 Therefore, just as the Supreme Court held in eBay,
the copyright owner must survive a test before an injunction will be
granted; not only is an automatic injunction rule against the policies of
17 U.S.C § 502(a), such a rule is inherently unfair to the public interest
and to the accused copyright infringer.
94
E. The eBay Decision Will Make it More Difficult for Patent Trolls to
Receive Permanent Injunctions Against their Patent Infringement
Victims
As was mentioned above, the Supreme Court held in the eBay case
that before granting a patent owner a permanent injunction against an
infringer, a court must first ensure that the four-factor test laid out
above 95 has been satisfied. 96 By solidifying this rule and reversing the
Federal Circuit's general rule that a permanent injunction will issue
following a finding of patent infringement, 97 the Supreme Court has
taken the first step towards minimizing the damage that a patent troll can
have on a company or individual inventor.
The third prong of the four-factor test will have the most immediate
impact in preventing patent trolls from damaging companies and
individuals as significantly as they have in the past.98 Under that prong,
90. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006).
91. eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006).
92. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See supra note 58.
96. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839 (2006).
97. MercExchange v. eBay, 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
98. In the first trial court decision applying the eBay decision, Judge Davis of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas refused to grant the patent
holder a permanent injunction against the infringer even though a jury verdict had already
granted the patent holder $115 million in damages. z4 Technologies v. Microsoft, 434 F.
Supp. 2d 437, 438, 442 (D. Tex. 2006); Fitzpatrick, supra note 26, at 2. The court
determined that the patent holder would not lose any profits if an injunction was not
issued against the infringer and that the balance of hardships, prong three of the four-
factor test, weighed in favor of the infringer. z4, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 444.
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it must be shown that the benefit to the patent owner outweighs the
detriment to the infringer in order for a permanent injunction to issue.99
In the case of a patent troll, this prong will be extremely difficult to
satisfy. By definition, a patent troll does not manufacture any
products.'00 Therefore, the benefit to a patent troll of being granted a
permanent injunction against an infringer, preventing the infringer from
continuing to manufacture the infringing device or use the infringing
process, is practically nullified because the infringing company is not
taking away any business from the patent troll. The infringing company,
however, will suffer a significant hardship if a permanent injunction is to
issue because it will no longer be able to create the infringing product or
use the infringing process that is a major component of its business
practice. Therefore, through prong three of the four-factor test, it appears
that patent trolls will have a difficult burden to meet in order to
demonstrate that the benefit they will receive through a permanent
injunction is greater than the harm to the infringing company or
individual. In this way, patent trolls will have a more difficult time
receiving permanent injunctions against their accused infringers.
Patent trolls will have a more difficult time acquiring exorbitant
licensing fees from accused infringers as a result of the eBay case.1°
One of the major reasons that companies accused of infringement chose
to settle their cases prior to litigation was to avoid having a permanent
injunction issued against them.'0 2 Under the Supreme Court's four-factor
test, companies accused of infringing a patent owned by a patent troll
will be more willing to litigate and allow the court to determine a fair
verdict, including, but not limited to, a compulsory licensing
arrangement. 0 3 The relief that accused infringers feared the most prior
to the eBay decision was a permanent injunction because permanent
injunctions have the potential to take a company out of existence.' 0 4 If a
company thrives on the manufacture of one product, a permanent
injunction preventing it from creating that product will put the company
out of business. Now that accused infringers will be able to go to trial
and actually litigate whether or not a permanent injunction is necessary,
99. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839.
100. Barker, supra note 2, at 7.
101. Fitzpatrick, supra note 26, at 3.
102. Id. at 1. This was because under the Federal Circuit's rule, a permanent
injunction was issued almost automatically following a finding of infringement.
MercExchange v. eBay, 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
103. Fitzpatrick, supra note 26, at 3.
104. Tom Corrado, Ken Godlewski & Eric Sophir, Proposed Patent Act of 2005
Seeks to Raise Standard for Granting Permanent Injunctions for Patent Infringement,
May 19, 2005, http://www.kilpatrickstockton.com/publications/legal-alert.aspx?ID=30
(last visited June 1, 2007).
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fair, and reasonable, patent trolls will have a more difficult time
collecting exorbitant, unfair licensing fees.' 0 5
The eBay case puts companies and individuals who have been
accused of infringing a patent owned by a patent troll on more equal
footing with the patent trolls. Although the decision will not put patent
trolls out of business completely, it will make the effects of their lawsuits
less devastating. Patent trolls will no longer be able to extract exorbitant
licensing fees from accused infringers by threatening them with
permanent injunctions if the accused infringer does not follow through
with the patent troll's licensing fee demands. Instead, more accused
infringers will litigate the infringement suits and allow the courts to
determine an equitable resolution. The Supreme Court is allowing patent
trolls to continue to exist, but the Court, through the eBay case, has
definitely taken a step towards fighting the patent trolls by not allowing
them to cause as much harm to accused infringers as they have in past
years. 
06
V. KSR International Company v. Teleflex, Inc: Is the Standard Used
by Patent Examiners when Determining if a Patent is Obvious Too
Stringent?
The other case that will likely cause injury to the work of patent
trolls is KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., a case that the United States
Supreme Court decided on April 30, 2007.107 In that case, Teleflex, a
patent troll, was suing KSR for infringement of one of Teleflex's
patents. 0 8 KSR won summary judgment at the district court level'0 9 by
convincing the court that the invention was obvious based on a
combination of prior art."10 However, the district court's ruling was
105. There is still uncertainty as to how the courts will determine whether a
permanent injunction should issue in a particular case. Fitzpatrick, supra note 26, at 3.
The debate is over whether there will be two separate trials, one for the infringement and
another for the permanent injunction. Id. Despite the discussion amongst scholars, only
time and fresh court decisions applying the eBay case will reveal the full ramifications of
the eBay case. Id. at 4.
106. Following are some examples of settlement agreements that patent trolls have
benefited from prior to the eBay case. Microsoft settled with Burst for $60 million in
2005 based on a 2001 version of Windows Media Player that Microsoft marketed. Peter
Burrows, Underdog or Patent Troll, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Apr. 24, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_1 7/b3981070.htm (last visited June
1, 2007). RIM paid NTP $612.5 million in 2005 in order to settle the infringement suit
over the Blackberry. Radack, supra note 10, at 3. In May 2005, Medtonic, Inc. settled a
4-year long infringement suit over spinal fusion technology with Karlin Technology, Inc.
for $1.35 billion. Qaiser & Chandran, supra note 6, at 2.
107. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
108. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F.App'x. 282, 283 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
109. Id. at 284.
110. Under the Patent Act, a patent may not be obtained if "the differences between
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overturned by the Federal Circuit, which determined that the district
court improperly applied the teaching, suggestion, motivation test in its
obviousness determination."' Following that reversal, the Supreme
Court ruled that the Federal Circuit's teaching, suggestion, motivation
test was too stringent. 1 2  In doing so, the Supreme Court not only
reversed the KSR case, but also put a question mark on twenty-five years
of Federal Circuit precedent utilizing the teaching, suggestion,
motivation test. 1
3
A. Teaching, Suggestion, Motivation: The Standard of Obviousness
Existing Prior to the Supreme Court Decision
The issue in this case was whether the obviousness standard"
4
created by the Federal Circuit twenty-five years ago was too stringent;
thereby allowing too many patents to issue that should have been
rejected by the examiners in the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO).' 1 ' Because the Federal Circuit's obviousness test was
so strict, 1 6 the examiner had the burden of finding a specific document
that proved a suggestion to combine two pieces of prior art, a test that
went well beyond the examiner's own personal knowledge. 1 7 Under the
teaching, suggestion, motivation test, a patent would only be deemed
invalid if the person challenging the validity of the patent was able to
show why "a person of ordinary skill in the art, possessed with the
understandings and knowledge reflected in the prior art, and motivated
by the general problem facing the inventor, would have been led to make
the combination recited in the [patent] claims."
'"18
Patent trolls took advantage of this low nonobviousness standard by
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which such subject matter pertains." 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
(2006).
111. Teleflex, 119 F.App'x. at 290.
112. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741.
113. Rachel Krevans & Matthew I. Kreeger, Supreme Court Issues Groundbreaking
Ruling Making it Easier to Invalidate Patents as Obvious, MORRISON FOERSTER, Apr.
2007, http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/12234.html (last visited June 1,2007).
114. The obviousness standard developed by the Federal Circuit requires examiners
or courts to show detailed objective evidence of a prior teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine inventions of prior art that would have led a person of ordinary
skill in the art to combine the prior art as is claimed. Id. at 290.
115. Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 119 F.App'x. 282 (2006)(No. 04-1350).
116. The obviousness test referred to here is the Federal Circuit's teaching,
suggestion, motivation test.
117. Id.
118. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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acquiring patents on inventions that were obvious because getting a
patent application to issue based on the teaching, suggestion, motivation
standard of obviousness was simply too easy." 9 This test allowed patent
applications to issue that should not have issued because they were trivial
or obvious over the prior art. 20  By reversing the Federal Circuit's
teaching, suggestion, motivation test, the Supreme Court has taken
another obvious step towards fighting the patent trolls.
B. Oral Argument
The oral argument in the KSR case took place on November 28,
2006.121 Throughout the oral argument, the Justices made it quite clear
that they did not understand the basic principles of the teaching,
suggestion, motivation test. Justice Breyer went as far as to claim that
he "just [doesn't] understand what is meant by the term 'motivation."",1
23
Justice Scalia went even further when he stated that "[i]t is misleading to
say that the whole world is embraced within these three nouns, teaching,
suggestion, or motivation, and then you define teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to mean anything that renders it nonobvious. This is
gobbledygook. It really is, it's irrational."'' 24 In other words, Justice
Scalia believed that the teaching, suggestion, motivation test was being
used improperly such that inventions were being found nonobvious when
in reality they were obvious variations of already existing prior art.1
25
Furthermore, Justice Roberts, when questioning how the words
"teaching, motivation, and suggestion" are any different than the word
"obvious" stated that the teaching, suggestion, motivation test is "worse
than meaningless because it complicates the inquiry rather than focusing
on the statute."'
' 26
Based on the expressions of the Supreme Court Justices throughout
the oral argument, it appears that they are confused as to why the
teaching, suggestion, motivation test ever came into existence. Instead,
119. Id.
120. Brief for Ford Motor Co. and DaimlerChrysler Corp. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 119 F.App'x. 282 (2006)(No. 04-
1350).
121. Transcript of Oral Argument, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., et al., (No. 04-
1350) (Nov. 28, 2006).
122. Posting of Michael Factor to The IP Factor, http://blog.ipfactor.co.il/2006/11/30/
ksr-v-teleflex-judge-scala-the-teaching-suggestion-motivation-test-is-gobbledygook/
(Nov. 30, 2006, 11:31 EST).
123. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9:19-20, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., et al.,
(No. 04-1350) (Nov. 28, 2006).
124. Id. at 41:6-12.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 40:11-13.
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the Justices believe that the original statute, stating that an invention is
obvious as long as a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the
invention was made believes that the invention is obvious, is the one that
should be used when determining whether an invention is obvious or
not.' 27 When the Court wrote its Opinion in KSR, it followed its strong
language of the Oral Argument in overruling the Federal Circuit's
teaching, suggestion, motivation test in favor of using the language of
section 103(a) of the Patent Act 128 as well as the precedent of Graham v.
Deere. 1 
29
C. Implications that Overruling the Teaching, Suggestion, Motivation
Test Will Have on Patent Trolls
Now that the Supreme Court has overruled the Federal Circuit's
teaching, suggestion, motivation test for determining whether a patent is
obvious, patent trolls will undoubtedly be affected in a negative way.
30
Patent trolls will be hindered in their quest to extract large licensing fees
from individuals and companies whom they accuse of infringement.
Patent trolls had been able to take advantage of the low standard for
passing the obviousness threshold in the USPTO. More specifically,
patent trolls have acquired patents that may not otherwise have been
granted if the obviousness standard was as difficult to surpass as it
should be under the Patent Act.' 3' Under KSR, many infringement cases
may result in a patent currently in force being invalidated because it was
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time that it was made.
132
Additionally, competitors of patent trolls may initiate reexamination
proceedings, 33 the ultimate result of which will be patent trolls losing
their patents due to obviousness. 134
It is probable that KSR will have the effect of invalidating patents
127. Id. at 44:19-23.
128. 35 U.S.C. 103(a) (2006) (stating that a patent may not be obtained "if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains").
129. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). This precedent stated that when
evaluating a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 103, "the scope and content of the prior art are to
bc determined; differences between the claims at issue and the prior art are to be
ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the art resolved." Id. at 17. Additionally,
Graham allowed secondary considerations to be viewed in order to assist in making the
obviousness determination. Id. at 17-18.
130. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1735 (2007).
131. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
132. Krevins & Kreeger, supra note 114.
133. A reexamination proceeding is when the USPTO takes a second look at a patent
to determine its validity, oftentimes initiated by a third party. See 35 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.
134. Krevins & Kreeger, supra note 114.
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that were obvious at the time of creation, but there is uncertainty as to
how drastic the change will be. In KSR, the Court stated that the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals 135 "captured a helpful insight" when they
established the teaching, suggestion, motivation test. 136  Therefore,
although the Court believes that the Federal Circuit applied the test too
rigidly in Teleflex, 137 it also believes that the test is one factor that can be
helpful in determining the obviousness of a patent. 138  It will be
interesting to see how the patent examiners and the district courts
interpret the Supreme Court's holding in the months to come.
Although all parties who have filed patent applications in the
USPTO in the past twenty-five years have benefited from the leniency
associated with the obviousness standard, patent trolls may be the entities
that have benefited the most. While companies were making obvious
changes to their current technologies, unbeknownst to them, patent trolls
were acquiring patents on those technologies. 139 By deciding to make the
obviousness standard more difficult to exceed by overruling the Federal
Circuit's teaching, suggestion, motivation test, the patent trolls will be
rightfully stopped from pursuing litigation against companies that are
using technologies that are obvious variations of patented technologies
that those companies hold.
As an example that should now be familiar, co-founder of NTP,
David Stout, filed for a series of patents premised on the theory of
wireless e-mail. 140  However, although the USPTO is now trying to
invalidate many of NTP's "wireless e-mail" patents because they were
simply too obvious to merit patenting, NTP was able to do significant
damage to RIM, the maker of the Blackberry. 141 Being a patent troll is
extremely risky because although it is rather easy to get a patent due to
the lenient obviousness standard, it is rare that a patent troll will acquire
135. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals is the court that originally came up
with the teaching, suggestion, motivation test. It was not until 1982 that the Court of
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit came into existence upon Ronald Reagan's
signing of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, http://www.fedcir.gov (law visited June 1, 2007); U.S. Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/patent-bdy (last visited
June 1, 2007).
136. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007).
137. The case was called Teleflex in the Federal Circuit and was appealed by KSR.
That is why the names Teleflex and KSR are used interchangeably throughout the
preceding paragraphs.
138. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741.
139. Posting of gabrielgOl to Technology Review, http://www.technology
review.com/Infotech/17459/page2/ (Sept. 6, 2006, 20:43 EST).
140. Tim Wu, Weapons of Business Destruction: How a Tiny Little Patent Troll Got
Blackberry in a Headlock, SLATE, Feb. 6, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2135559/ (last
visited June 1, 2007).
141. Id.
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a patent that will end up being worth any money. 142 However, NTP's
risk paid off when RIM decided to market the Blackberry, a device used
by consumers primarily for its wireless internet capabilities. 43 If the
patent examiners were not required to examine under strict deadlines and
the lenient obviousness standard, 144 they may have been better fit to
prevent patent trolls from collecting multi-million dollar settlements over
patents that are so obvious that they should never have been granted in
the first place.
VI. Conclusion
It has finally become evident to the Supreme Court that patent trolls
need to be prevented from causing such extensive damage to innovation.
The Supreme Court has now begun fighting back against the patent
trolls.
By overruling the Federal Circuit's general rule that permanent
injunctions will issue upon a finding of infringement in a patent litigation
case, the Supreme Court has taken away much of the leverage that patent
trolls have had in extorting large settlement fees from accused infringers.
Additionally, by overturning the Federal Circuit's teaching, suggestion,
motivation test for obviousness, the Supreme Court has taken the first
step towards preventing patent trolls from being able to sue companies
for infringement when those companies are actually utilizing technology
that is already in public use or obvious variations thereof. In eBay,
Justice Kennedy made it known that the Supreme Court will no longer
allow patent trolls to have undue leverage and power against innocent
and innovative manufacturing companies.
45
It seems that eBay and KSR are just the beginning of the Supreme
Court's battle against the patent trolls. The Supreme Court had not heard
a patent case in the twenty five years between 1981 and 2006.146
Hopefully, the Supreme Court has shown the public what is to come and
will continue to hear patent cases in larger numbers in order to keep the




144. Id. The lenient obviousness standard is referring to the teaching, suggestion,
motivation test.
145. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
146. Amy Sorrel, Supreme Court to Rule: When are medical patents too broad, AM.
MED. NEWS, Apr. 10,2006 http://www.amaassn.org/amednews/site/free/prl20410.htm (last
visited June 1, 2007).
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